Board independence and competence by Wagner, Alexander F
University of Zurich
Zurich Open Repository and Archive
Winterthurerstr. 190
CH-8057 Zurich
http://www.zora.uzh.ch
Year: 2011
Board independence and competence
Wagner, A F
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfi.2010.06.002.
Postprint available at:
http://www.zora.uzh.ch
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich.
http://www.zora.uzh.ch
Originally published at:
Wagner, A F (2011). Board independence and competence. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 20(1):71-93.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfi.2010.06.002.
Postprint available at:
http://www.zora.uzh.ch
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich.
http://www.zora.uzh.ch
Originally published at:
Wagner, A F (2011). Board independence and competence. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 20(1):71-93.
Board independence and competence
Abstract
This paper analyzes board independence and competence as distinct, but inextricably linked aspects of
board effectiveness. Competent directors add shareholder value because they have better information
about the quality of projects. While a CEO cares about shareholder value, he also wants his board to
behave loyally to him by agreeing to projects that give him private benefits. Because many aspects of
the CEO-board relationship are not contractible, the paper studies a model of relational contracts, a tool
that has hitherto been rarely used in work on corporate governance. The analysis reveals a tradeoff:
Inefficient loyalty is endogenously easier to obtain from a less competent board. The implied conflict of
interest between shareholders and the CEO is particularly pronounced in difficult times. Fortunately, the
tradeoff does not arise with respect to efficient loyalty. Several empirical predictions flow from the
model, some of which explain existing empirical facts while others are new.
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1. Introduction
The feeling that boards of directors sometimes, though certainly not always, act too much in line with CEOs’
preferences, rather than with shareholders’ preferences, and that some boards consist of individuals exceedingly loyal
to CEOs has led many countries to adopt new standards of corporate governance. For example, governance codices
of various countries as well as guidelines of exchanges such as the NYSE and the NASDAQ now prescribe a certain
number of ”independent” directors. The potential inadequacy of these structural reforms is brought out perhaps most
forcefully by the case of WorldCom. The board of WorldCom would have qualified as independent by today’s
standards (and even the CEO and chairman positions were separated). However, as Kaplan (2005) points out, the
directors ”were not truly independent” (p. 7). But what is ”true independence” (rather than de iure independence) as
opposed to what one might describe as de facto loyalty or obedience?
This paper analyzes director independence as an optimally chosen behavior, not as a given trait that is determined
by a director’s status as an outsider or his character. It posits that both insiders and outsiders, however defined, respond
to incentives in their relationship with the CEO.3 In particular, section 2 considers a firm where a (male) CEO would
like to implement projects (e.g., acquisitions) which sometimes have positive net present value (NPV) but sometimes
are value-destroying. A more competent board is better at helping the CEO choose projects that increase shareholder
value. In her monitoring role, the (female) board may oppose bad projects. The CEOwould like the board to be loyal to
him, i.e., to positively evaluate and ultimately agree to any project such as an acquisition, even if it is value-destroying.
This is because the CEO has an empire-building motive that may be stronger than the incentives for value-creation that
derive from his stock ownership in the firm. The board members also hold some stock in the firm, or care about their
career. Therefore, they will only agree to bad projects if they receive some rewards that compensate them for costly
acts of loyalty. For example, the board may be co-opted with gifts and perquisites. The paper begins by studying such
inefficient loyalty because this problem has received great attention in the policy discussion. The CEO and the board
usually cannot write an explicit contract on the exchange of loyalty for rewards. Rather, they need to sustain this
exchange through a self-enforcing contract. Therefore, this paper uses a repeated game model to study the board-CEO
relationship. As such, one contribution of this paper is to introduce this methodology to the governance context from
which it has so far been conspicuously absent. The relational contract framework yields several predictions.
First, inefficient loyalty may be feasible only for less than fully competent boards, because highly competent
directors require large rewards for loyalty, but these rewards may not be credibly promised by the manager. Although
this finding is in itself not too surprising – it can be interpreted as a corollary of the Folk Theorem – its implication
is relevant for the corporate governance debate: Ceteris paribus, where shareholders are powerful enough to elect
a competent board, they will have to worry less about that board becoming too obedient to the CEO. The current
discussion on boards often emphasizes the importance of competent and independent boards, but rarely recognizes
3This is not to say that personality plays no role for loyalty; of course, it does. So do personal connections that exist between CEOs and boards.
This paper analyzes aspects of director independence that are due to economic incentives.
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their inherent connection. The analysis here reveals that these two valued qualities are distinct, but inextricably
linked. Highly competent boards usually behave more independently, but may behave loyally if the CEO has the right
incentives at his disposal. Conversely, even incompetent boards may behave independently if the environment makes
it too costly for the CEO to obtain loyalty from them. It is, therefore, by no means to be taken for granted that CEOs
are always able to capture their boards.
Second, the model shows that while in difficult situations shareholders would prefer a competent board to help
them identify the rare positive NPV projects, it is precisely in these situations that the conflict of interest between the
CEO and shareholders is most pronounced; in particular, in these situations the CEO needs a less than fully competent
board in order to secure loyalty. Only when the costs of bad projects become too steep will the CEO prefer to forego
loyalty and instead interact with a competent board. By contrast, in easy situations (where the expected NPV of
projects is positive), the directors, even if they are ignorant about the state of the world, will approve all projects; there
is, thus, no need for the CEO to pay the board to act loyally, and no need for a repeated loyalty agreement.
Third, empirical predictions arise from recognizing how the CEO’s optimal choice of board competence varies
with the model parameters. Factors that decrease the level of competence compatible with loyalty will make loyalty
relatively costly to obtain, thus making it more attractive for the CEO to get a competent board after all. Thus, the
model implies that we should expect a positive correlation between director competence on the one hand and measures
of the power of the CEO’s and the board’s incentives, short-horizon interactions of the CEO and the board, difficulty
of appropriation of private benefits by the CEO, and the volatility of outcomes of projects, respectively, on the other
hand. Section 2 cites evidence that supports some of the model’s predictions, and details how the model’s hypotheses
can be tested and expanded by taking into account additional features of the real world.
Fourth, there may be cases where cooperation between CEOs and directors does not lead to costs for the firm
but rather improves firm performance, for example, because of a more effective information exchange. Fortunately,
under such circumstances, CEOs will themselves favor more competent directors because their competence increases
the “pie” that is available for sustaining the relational contract. There is, thus, no tradeoff between competence
and efficient loyalty. Section 3 discusses this extension and other implications of the model for term limits, voting
requirements on boards, etc. Section 3 also demonstrates that the results are robust to changes in modeling assump-
tions. It shows that partial loyalty agreements – where the CEO only requires and pays for loyalty in some states –
are strictly dominated by comprehensive agreements. It also demonstrates how the results hold under an alternative
timing assumption.
Section 4 analyzes how shareholders would optimally incentivize the CEO and the board in this setting. Not
surprisingly, with no constraints on incentives, shareholders could avoid inefficient board loyalty and obtain competent
boards by setting sufficiently high pay-performance sensitivities. This comes at a cost: Because in expectation more
good projects are realized, executive pay is higher. In this extreme case the empirical predictions for board competence
would not apply, as all boards would be competent. Of course, the board co-option problem is not the primary problem
that performance-related pay is designed to solve. Thus, if setting executive and director incentives that address the
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co-option problem is not costless, or if these incentives also need to address other problems such as moral hazard,
board co-option may well still obtain, as will the empirical predictions developed earlier.
Section 5 offers concluding remarks.
1.1. Related literature
The central and new feature of the analysis is that board independence is modeled as strategic behavior that is
partly determined by, but not identical to, board competence. As such, this paper contributes to the literature, going
back to Mace (1986) and Jensen (1993), that studies the practical difficulties inherent in making boards perform their
function as stewards of shareholders’ interests. It analyzes one element of what Williamson (2008) calls the ”intrinsic
limitations of boards in monitoring and managing respects” (p. 247). Among other things, he warns that de facto CEO
control can arise from lack of board competence (p. 261). This is also consistent with the results of Cohen et al. (2009)
that suggest that CEOs may favor incompetent “cheerleaders” (in Cohen et al.’s case, poorly performing analysts) on
the board. These studies, among others, reflect a growing sense in the literature that competence cannot be analyzed
separately from independence. This paper formalizes this idea, investigates its robustness, and derives implications
that follow from it. To do so, it recognizes that CEOs often wield substantial power in the choice of boards. For
example, the by far most common procedure for filling open seats on boards is for the CEO and the existing directors
to propose a slate of candidates, where the number of proposed directors corresponds exactly to the number of open
seats Cai et al. (2009b). Open contests over the choice of directors are still exceedingly rare Bebchuk (2003), and the
impact of new SEC regulation aimed it fostering competition for board seats remains to be seen. All this suggests that
formal measures of independence may not be highly informative about a board’s actual effectiveness.
This is particularly important because there is a large number of empirical studies on the corporate performance
effects of boards that have used board independence as a key explanatory variable. As dependent variables, empirical
studies have considered corporate decisions as well as firm performance. As an example for the first group of studies,
the turnover-performance sensitivity is indeed higher in firms with outsider-dominated boards Weisbach (1988), but
the effect is not very large and tends to disappear in later sample periods. Importantly for the present paper, Agrawal
and Chadha (2005) find that independence of directors per se does not decrease the probability of a company having
to restate earnings; only independence combined with financial literacy leads to this desired result. In the second
group of studies, while board independence predicts higher share prices in emerging markets Black et al. (2006), for
developed countries the evidence for greater performance of firms with more formally independent directors is weak
(see Bhagat and Black (2002) and Yermack (2006) for reviews). Indeed, recent research emphasizes the difficulties
of generating reliable and valid measures for corporate governance and the actual independence of directors Larcker
et al. (2007).4 In sum, standard measures of de iure independence appear to be at most imperfect predictors of
4Detecting a relation between performance and governance characteristics in the data is also likely to have been due to a failure to include all
appropriate exogenous variables that determine both performance and endogenously chosen governance characteristics together (see Demsetz and
Lehn (1985), Himmelberg et al. (1999) and Palia (2001), for example). Recently, the literature has used GMM panel techniques and has unearthed
some evidence of the value-relevance of independence of directors and other governance features in international contexts Chhaochharia and Laeven
(2009) while for the US the data continue to show no causal relation between board structure and current firm performance Wintoki et al. (2008).
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actual behavior, governance outcomes, and firm performance. This motivates this paper’s inquiry into the de facto
independence of boards.
A growing theoretical and empirical literature has analyzed boards as an endogenous institution. For space rea-
sons, the discussion is limited to the most closely related theoretical papers.5 Warther (1998) provides a model where
the CEO ejects dissenting board members, leading directors to threaten to fire the CEO only in especially dire times.
By contrast, the present paper explicitly models the CEO’s decisions and focuses on the CEO’s choice of director
competence.6 In their seminal paper, Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) show that powerful and competent CEOs can
make the board less independent. Independence in that paper is modeled as a preference parameter, namely, distaste
for monitoring, that is chosen by way of negotiation between the CEO and the board. Here it is modeled as behavior.
Harris and Raviv (2008b) study a model that allocates control of the board to insiders (whom they define as as depen-
dent board) or outsiders (independent directros). They find that optimal boards employ larger numbers of outsiders
when managers’ private benefits are high and the cost of monitoring is low. This paper instead considers a CEO who
chooses his own board, and focuses exclusively on the economic incentives, not the provenance of the director. Ku-
mar and Sivaramakrishnan (2008) show that dependent boards can actually increase shareholder value. In their model,
board dependence is modeled as intrinsic alignment with the interests of the CEO. Here, the focus is on the monitoring
role of the board and board dependence is not intrinsically given but a behavior. Moreover, boards vary in competence,
and the model yields the result that board competence needs to be sacrificed only for inefficient loyalty, not for efficient
loyalty. Drymiotes and Sivaramakrishnan (2007) also model strategic board behavior, but focus on the consulting role
and study how the board’s consulting behavior is affected by the incentive structure. Next, CEO-board friendships
may have advantages in terms of information revelation Adams and Ferreira (2007). Consistent with this notion, the
results in this paper imply that although more competent boards are less easily induced to inefficient loyalty, efficient
loyalty relationships are easier to sustain with them. Finally, Song and Thakor (2006) study a career concerns setup
where the CEO controls the board’s screening information. Among other things, they find that a CEO may desire a
less able director in economic upturns. The present paper is, therefore, consistent with this work, but provides another
angle by considering the co-option problem between the CEO and the board, rather than an information transmission
problem. It is interesting that two such different modeling frameworks both yield the prediction that a CEO may prefer
less than fully competent directors.
5Recent empirical work on how boards tend to be composed according to economic needs include Klein (2002), Lehn et al. (2003), Boone et al.
(2007), Coles et al. (2008a), Coles et al. (2008b), and Linck et al. (2008).
6A recent attempt to study extreme board obedience is Morck (2008). He makes the connection between directors’ subservience and the
innate psychological predisposition to obey authority that was famously demonstrated by Milgram (1974). He concludes that dissenting peers and
independent directors are the solution. This paper serves as a formalization of some of the arguments, but also as a caveat to these conclusions.
Independence and dissent are always (also) choice variables, not (only) given traits of character.
4
2. De facto board independence or obedience
2.1. Setup
Consider the interaction between a (male) CEO (C) and a (female) board (B).7 Every period, a project opportunity
comes along. The projects are sufficiently large for the board to be directly involved in decision-making. For example,
one might consider acquisitions, strategy choices, and other large projects. With probability p, the project is of high
quality and yields an NPV yH > 0 for the firm. With probability (1 − p) , the project is of low quality and yields an
NPV yL < 0 for the firm. The expected NPV is Ey = yL + p∆, where ∆ = yH − yL > 0. We can allow Ey to be
positive or negative.8 Ey > 0 describes easy situations, and Ey < 0 indicates difficult situations. The main analysis
concentrates on difficult situations. For example, although there is some discussion in the literature on the average
wealth creation or destruction effect of acquisitions, one plausible case is that in some industries, acquisitions are on
average a bad idea for shareholders. The formal results for easy situations are available on request; they are discussed
them informally below.
Basic payoffs. C and B both receive a fraction of output as compensation.9 For some output yi, C’s and B’s payoffs
are ayi and syi, respectively. A more complete model would also consider a moral hazard problem to motivate and
explicitly describe the (typically non-linear) incentive scheme for a risk-averse C, but linear compensation schemes are
convenient to present the paper’s point. The two agents’ participation constraints are satisfied, e.g., because holding
a position in the company is sufficiently rewarding in itself. Shareholders are the residual claimants and receive
(1 − a − s) yi. In section 4, the paper discusses the extent to which shareholders can circumvent some of the challenges
described in this model.
C’s private benefits. C does not observe project quality on his own; he requires the help from the board. However, C
derives private benefits from implementing any project, be it a positive or negative NPV project. Denote these private
benefits with ψ > 0. (The results also hold if the board also receives some private benefits, albeit smaller ones than the
CEO.) Assume that ψ+ yL < 0. Thus, there is an incentive scheme aˆ that falls short of selling the firm completely to C
(aˆ < 1) such that C does not derive sufficiently large private benefits from implementing projects that he is willing to
implement a bad project. Put yet another way: Negative NPV projects and board loyalty are also socially inefficient,
even taking into account that C receives benefits from them. We will say that CEO incentives are (relatively) high-
powered when ψ + ayL < 0, and (relatively) low-powered when ψ + ayL > 0. In this section, we consider the case
where ψ + ayL > 0, i.e., C wants to implement all projects. We turn to high-powered incentives in section 4.
7Like most of the literature, the model does not consider interactions within the board, but rather treats the board as a unitary actor. See Gillette
et al. (2008) for an exception.
8It is assumed that the firm otherwise generates sufficient profits to keep the firm in business even if it implements negative NPV projects. The
model abstracts from the complication that there may be periods where Ey is positive and others where it is negative.
9That there is some degree of pay-for-performance for CEOs is not controversial. For directors, this assumption is a shortcut to model the various
explicit incentives and career concerns documented by Gilson (1990), Kaplan and Reishus (1990), Farrell and Whidbee (2000) and Yermack (2004),
for example.
5
B’s action. B decides on the project (whether or not she has learned the quality). Some of the biggest corporate
decisions do involve board approval as modeled here. For other, smaller decisions, C has the decision rights. In those
instances, the assumption that B decides about the project is a shortcut for a more elaborate apparatus, in which B
sends a message about the project quality to C, perhaps also stating the intensity of her preferences. C can implement
a project even if the message B sends is very bad, but this is costly to him, because by virtue of B’s monitoring role she
can also ultimately overrule or fire C. Thus, C has to expend effort to overcome resistance of B. A more detailed model
of the advisory process between boards and CEOs along these lines would be more realistic, but for the purposes of
the present analysis, not much seems lost in terms of economic insights by having B agree or disagree to the project.
When B agrees to a project, she acts loyally. When B is against a project, C‘s utility is reduced to what he would earn
if he were fired. C earns zero as his reservation utility.
Rewards for costly loyalty. Given that B suffers costs from agreeing to a negative (expected) NPV-project, C has to
offer B rewards if she consents nonetheless. Denote these rewards by x. Rewards may, for example, consist in C
lauding B’s abilities in his conversations with other CEOs such that B’s chances for securing additional directorships
are enhanced. The CEO may also provide perquisites like planes (as in the case of WorldCom). To make matters
as hard as possible for C, assume that he bears all the costs. To the extent that it is the company – or rather the
shareholders – that pays these costs, a C with low-powered incentives has an incentive to always try to induce loyalty.
The notion that loyalty is costly for board members and that CEOs have various options at their disposal for reward-
ing loyalty frequently appears in anecdotes and in the empirical literature on corporate governance (see, e.g., Bebchuk
and Fried (2004)). There is substantial evidence that directors who participate in corporate governance changes that
reflect greater board control over management are subjected to informal social sanctioning by the CEO and other
directors who are loyal to the CEO Westphal and Khanna (2003). They may be ejected Mace (1986). Conversely,
when they behave loyally, directors can avail themselves of pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits Main et al. (1995),
and directors who ingratiate themselves with the CEO are more likely to gain additional board appointments Westphal
and Stern (2007, 2006). Moreover, Lorsch and MacIver (1989) document that prestige and business contacts are very
important, sometimes more important than explicit monetary rewards. What this analysis adds is that it shows how the
required rewards vary endogenously with the level of board competence.
Note that the costs that B needs to bear in order to be loyal need not be restricted to the direct monetary cost of
lower present compensation. For example, to the extent that C requires B to participate in fraudulent behavior, the
director may lose other directorships when a lawsuit is filed. Fich and Shivdasani (2008) provide evidence for this and
calculate the median value of a directorship as close to US$1 million, not taking into account the effort needed for the
directorship. Srinivasan (2005) finds that outside directors are penalized with a loss of directorships when their firms
issue an accounting restatement, with the greatest loss in directorships for audit committee members and for the most
severe earnings restatements.
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Noncontractibility. Rarely will C and B be able to write a court-enforceable contract about B’s voting behavior and C’s
rewarding behavior. The essence of B-C loyalty lies in the non-contractibility of important aspects of their interaction.
Because contracts are incomplete, C can only aim to establish loyalty through repeated interaction.
B’s competence. The board’s competence is denoted by θ, and C chooses θ. One interpretation is that θ describes the
amount and quality of information the CEO shares with the board. Alternatively, θ is a characteristic of the board
itself, such as cognitive ability, industry experience, or financial or technological expertise. For purposes of cross-firm
empirical work, the latter interpretation is probably more operational, while for understanding individual cases, the
former interpretation is useful. The assumption that C determines θ may appear to exaggerate C’s power. However,
in many firms, CEOs indeed frequently play a dominant role vis-a-vis their shareholders.10
The role of competence is to allow the board to identify the quality of projects that come the firm’s way. In
particular, with probability θ, B learns the project type. B passes on this information to C; the only friction in the
B-C-interaction is the non-contractibility of behavior.11 With probability (1 − θ), B does not learn anything.
Each period, there are thus 3 states: In state H, B has learned that the project type is High. In state L, B has learned
that the project type is Low. And in state U, B remains ignorant. The stage payoffs in these three states are given by
the following payoff matrices.
Table 1: Payoff matrix in state where B learns that the project is High
State High (H): probability θp
B consents B dissents
C rewards ayH + ψ − x, syH + x −x, x
C does not reward ayH + ψ, syH 0, 0
Table 2: Payoff matrix in state where B learns that the project is Low
State Low (L): probability θ (1 − p)
B consents B dissents
C rewards ayL + ψ − x, syL + x −x, x
C does not reward ayL + ψ, syL 0, 0
10Between 2003 and 2005, in 2484 out of 2488 shareholder meetings in a sample of the largest US corporations, the number of directors to be
elected equaled the number of seats Cai et al. (2009b). Speaking for DWS, the largest German mutual fund company, Kaldemorgen and Gruber
(2007) point out that also for the European case they have ”the impression that CEOs choose their own boards of directors” (p. 264).
11Note that because of the assumed decision-making power allocation, θ is measuring board competence. In isolation, θ could mean CEO
competence or even the quality of the CEO-board match. But this would be inconsistent with the assumption that B makes the decisions - in that
case, we would need to specify an information transmission game. This is an interesting alternative route, outside the scope of this paper. It is also
possible that a board could try to extract bribes from the CEO by threatening to veto the project even if it is a good project. At least in the model
presented here, this threat is not credible in the sense of being subgame-perfect. See Drymiotes and Sivaramakrishnan (2007) for an analysis when
the board is unable to commit ex ante to supplying monitoring and consulting inputs.
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Table 3: Expected payoff matrix in state where B does not learn project quality State Unknown (U) :
probability (1 − θ)
B consents B dissents
C rewards aEy + ψ − x, sEy + x −x, x
C does not reward aEy + ψ, sEy 0, 0
Timing. In period 0, C has to announce which x he is intending to pay for loyalty. He can only announce one reward,
independent of the state.
In period 1, with probabilities {θp, θ (1 − p) , (1 − θ)} the three states {H, L,U} get realized. This is commonly
observed.
In period 2, the agents play the game of the relevant stage in a simultaneous-move fashion.
In the case of repeated interaction, the economy restarts in period 0. Depending on the history of play, players
optimize their strategies (on the strategies used to sustain cooperation see below).
2.2. Statically optimal behavior (spot interaction)
Consider first the case where the above game is played once only. To solve for the level of board competence that
C prefers, we determine the equilibria in each of the three possible states. C then chooses θ to maximize his expected
utility.
It is easy to verify that the Nash equilibrium in state H is {not reward, consent}. In states L and U, it is {not reward,
dissent}. C’s expected utility in spot interaction is, therefore, given by
EuSC = θp (ayH + ψ) + θ (1 − p) 0 + (1 − θ) 0, (1)
Shareholder utility is given by
EuSS = θp (1 − a − s) yH + θ (1 − p) (1 − a − s) 0 + (1 − θ) (1 − a − s) 0. (2)
Clearly, in difficult environments (Ey < 0), θ = 1 is optimal for the CEO. Intuitively, C would rather avoid B possibly
not learning the state of the world, because in case of doubt, B dissents. In other words, C is no worse off when B
finds out that the state is L than if the state is U. Thus, C maximizes the probability that B finds out that the state is H.
In summary:
Proposition 1. In spot interaction, the CEO prefers a maximally competent board. θ∗S = 1, Eu
S
C
= p (ayH + ψ) ,
EuS
S
= p(1 − a − s)yH .
2.3. Repeated interaction
Because C derives private benefits that outweigh his losses even from negative NPV projects when his incentives
are low-powered, he would like B to agree to the projects in all states. (The case where C does not require loyalty in
all three states is discussed in the robustness section below.) Although B’s loyalty to C may not be in the shareholders’
interests, C may be able to secure loyalty by offering sufficient loyalty rewards x. However, since loyalty and its
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rewards are non-contractible, the only way to achieve this result is through repeated interaction and a relational (self-
enforcing) contract. The crucial difference of this analysis from that of a standard repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma is that
C can choose which amount x to offer and with whom to play the game.
C and B will usually not know when their interaction will end; most likely the end date will not be common
knowledge. Therefore, it is appropriate to analyze their interaction as if it were infinitely repeated. That is, both
agents discount the future with discount factor δ < 1.12 For example, we might think of the discount factor being
determined by the probability of a hostile takeover; everything else being equal, if that probability is lower, it is more
likely that the CEO-board interaction is long-lasting.
In this setting, consider self-enforcing (relational) loyalty with rewards contracts. We concentrate on stationary
contracts of the following form: B promises to be loyal to C. C promises to pay x in each period.13
The timing of events becomes relevant. In particular, we need to ask whether C can take ψ, but not pay x, and
whether B can take x, but still dissent. That is, can the parties deviate from the loyalty agreement and still obtain the
other side’s cooperative contribution? In the standard Prisoner’s Dilemma, the answer to this question is yes. Even
when C and B do not literally move simultaneously, this is the correct assumption to make when they do not learn the
other party’s move until later in the period. As this is a plausible relevant case in real-world interaction between the
CEO and the board, the analysis proceeds under this assumption. The robustness section below considers sequential
moves.
2.3.1. Feasibility of loyalty and non-reneging constraints
We now turn to the conditions for loyalty with rewards to be an equilibrium. As is common in the literature on
self-enforcing contracts, this equilibrium is supported by trigger strategies, i.e., strategies in which C and B promise
each other allegiance and rewards, and any one-time deviation results in both players exerting the statically optimal
behavior in all future periods.14 We need to consider two cases: the case of θ > 0 and the case of θ = 0. The difference
is that with θ > 0, the quality of the project is never unknown, while under θ = 0, the quality of the project is always
unknown.
Suppose that θ > 0. Both agents know that on the reneging path, B will only agree to the project when she knows
12This discount factor combines pure time preference with the assumption that the game between B and C ends each period with some probability.
Specifically, suppose that the rate of time preference of B and C is r, the period length is ∆, and there is a probability ρ of continuing from one
period to the next. Then $1 tomorrow, to be collected if the game lasts that long, is worth nothing with probability 1− ρ and worth δ = e−r∆ dollars
with probability ρ. This uncertain future inflow thus has expected discounted value of δ′ = ρδ. This corresponds to the situation where ρ′ = 1 and
r′ = r− ln (ρ) /∆. In short, the infinitely repeated game represents a game that terminates in finite time with probability 1. See Fudenberg and Tirole
(1996) for more details (p. 148). Numerous papers studying trust and cooperation have used the same approach, in areas such as economic history
and culture Greif (1998), labor economics Bull (1987), industrial organization Rotemberg and Saloner (1986), incentive theory Levin (2003), and
organizational economics Baker et al. (2002), among others.
13Levin (2003) provides a general theorem that shows we can limit our attention to stationary contracts in settings like the one considered here.
There would be state-varying payments if the outside wage were also state-varying Thomas and Worrall (1988). The robustness section below
shows that C is better off with loyalty payments every period than just in states where loyalty is costly to B.
14Using trigger strategies may not be particularly realistic, but it is the standard approach for studying related problems Bull (1987); MacLeod
and Malcomson (1989); Baker et al. (2002). This assumption is motivated by the work of Abreu (1988) who showed that if cooperation is attainable
in a repeated game, it is without loss of generality to concentrate on the worst punishment path. The static equilibrium remains an equilibrium also
in the repeated game. Considering the newly arising cooperation equilibrium is the standard assumption for the analysis of self-enforcing contracts.
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it is of high quality. C’s non-reneging constraint, therefore, is,15
ayL + ψ − x +
δ
1 − δ

θp (ayH + ψ − x) + θ (1 − p) (ayL + ψ − x)+
(1 − θ) (aEy + ψ − x)
 (NR-C)
≥ ayL + ψ +
δ
1 − δ
[
θp (ayH + ψ) + θ (1 − p) (0) + (1 − θ) (0)
]
, (3)
which implies that
x ≤ δ (ψ + aEy) − δθp (ψ + ayH) . (4)
This condition says that the CEO will not renege only if the reward is less than the discounted value of the net gain
from one more period of loyalty. This net gain is smaller if the board is more competent, because a more competent
board is more likely to agree even if it is not loyal, ceteris paribus.
For B, honoring her promise of loyalty is preferred if and only if deviating today (and thus avoiding the negative
NPV project) plus spot interaction going forward is dominated by suffering syL < 0, but obtaining x in each period.
Formally, B’s non-reneging constraint (NR-B) is, in a state where B knows that the project is of low quality,16
syL + x +
δ
1 − δ

θp (syH + x) + θ (1 − p) (syL + x)+
(1 − θ) (sEy + x)
 (NR-B)
≥ x +
δ
1 − δ
[
θpsyH + θ (1 − p) (0) + (1 − θ) (0)
]
. (5)
Simplifying yields
x ≥ −
syL
δ
− sp (yH (1 − θ) − yL) . (6)
That is, the minimal amount of rewards B requires are increasing in B’s competence. Loyalty is costly for competent
boards because they may know with greater certainty that a bad state was realized.
Combining the two NR’s yields the maximum level of competence compatible with loyalty,
θ ≤
δ2
(
ψ + aEy + sp∆
δ
)
+ syL
δ2p
(
ψ + ayH + s
yH
δ
) . (7)
From this inequality, we can make the following observation.
Proposition 2. (Feasibility of loyalty) Loyalty of too competent boards may be infeasible.
In other words, if a CEO is given a sufficiently competent board, or if his power in lobbying for a less competent
board is limited, there will likely be no loyalty. The basic insight of the model, therefore, is that independence and
competence are linked, but separate concepts: Even a highly competent board may act loyally, and even an incompetent
15In studying the non-reneging constraints, we can restrict ourselves to the case where we start in state L. That is the state where the reneging
temptation is greatest for B.
16Note that the non-reneging constraint when B does not learn the project’s quality is implied by NR-B.
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board may act independently, depending on the economic environment in which the CEO and the board interacts. In
particular, there is a positive level of competence for which loyalty is feasible only if
ψ + yL
(
a +
s
δ2
)
+ p
(
a +
s
δ
)
∆ > 0, (8)
in which case the numerator in expression (7) is positive. This result can be interpreted as a version of a Folk Theorem.
Loyalty may also be infeasible for completely incompetent boards. To see this, consider the case of θ = 0.
This changes B’s non-reneging constraint, because now it is certain that the state is U now and forever. Thus, the
non-reneging constraint in this case is
x ≥ −
sEy
δ
. (9)
Combining this with C’s non-reneging constraint (which remains unchanged), loyalty is feasible for zero board com-
petence if
ψ +
(
a +
s
δ2
)
Ey > 0. (10)
Note that this condition will fail for a small enough δ, too large a and s, and too negative Ey.
2.3.2. Desirability of loyalty
To determine whether C, in fact, desires to implement loyalty, the analysis proceeds in two steps. First, we
determine the optimal competence level C would choose if he wants to implement loyalty. Then, we compare the
welfare C obtains under optimal loyalty with the welfare under spot interaction.
If C is free to choose his board when implementing loyalty, which competence level will he prefer? From equation
(6), we see that loyalty is cheaper to obtain for less competent boards. Thus, C’s cost of inducing loyalty is minimized
by setting θ = 0, which, by equation (9), implies loyalty costs −
sEy
δ
per period. This leads to C’s expected utility per
period, EuL
C
= aEy + ψ +
sEy
δ
. Thus, we find that the present value of spot interaction in all future periods is greater
than the present of loyalty if and only if
Ω ≡
δ
1 − δ
[
EuSC − Eu
L
C
]
> 0⇔ (11)
p (ayH + ψ) > aEy + ψ +
sEy
δ
.
Simplifying this condition and rearranging yields
Proposition 3. (Desirability of loyalty) The CEO prefers loyalty (which involves zero competence of the board) to
spot interaction (which involves maximal board competence) if and only if
(1 − p) (ψ + ayL) +
sEy
δ
> 0. (12)
Note that desirability does not imply feasibility. Comparing conditions (10) and (12), it is apparent, for example,
that there are discount factors for which loyalty with zero board competence is desirable but not feasible. As long
as C and B are patient enough, as long as the low state is not too likely, and as long as the CEO’s pay-performance-
sensitivity is sufficiently large compared to the directors’, C can credibly promise to reward loyalty.
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2.3.3. Comparative statics and empirical predictions
The model holds several empirical predictions. The first prediction is that more competent directors will behave
less loyally. This is a relatively difficult hypothesis to test because loyalty may occur in ways unobservable to the
econometrician. However, there is some evidence that supports the prediction. For example, Agrawal and Chadha
(2005) find that the formal independence of boards as such is unrelated to the probability of a company restating
earnings. By contrast, the probability of restatement is lower in companies whose boards or audit committees have an
independent director with financial expertise. As Agrawal and Chadha argue, this finding is consistent with the idea
that only competent directors provide effective oversight of a firm’s financial reporting practices. Of course, part of
their phenomenon may arise simply because incompetent boards may not understand the facts, but the model here also
implies that de iure independent directors who are not competent are more easily coopted by a CEO who wishes to
manage earnings. (The CEO’s motivation for earnings management may arise not solely from private benefits but also
from higher short-term compensation. Short-term shareholders may also benefit from this, but long-term shareholders
will be hurt by the ultimately needed earnings restatement.)
The next set of predictions relates to how observed behavior is likely to vary with several parameters of the model.
In particular, the comparative statics that follow from Proposition 3 imply that:
Corollary 1. (i) When C has a greater stake in the firm’s performance, he will less likely implement loyalty.
(ii) When B has a greater stake in the firm’s performance, C will less likely implement loyalty.
(iii) The more private benefits C obtains from implementing projects, the more likely he is to implement loyalty.
(iv) For a given expected NPV Ey < 0, the worse the bad project outcome gets, the less likely C is to implement loyalty.
(v) The shorter the expected duration of the interaction between C and B is, the less likely C is to implement loyalty.
Proof. Properties (i) to (iv) follow immediately from inspection of (11). Property (v) is not obvious and is derived
in detail in the Appendix.
The same factors that make loyalty less feasible also make it less desirable for C. Moreover, loyalty entails lower
director competence. This is relevant empirically because it opens up the possibility of making board competence the
dependent variable. The set of key empirical predictions in this respect is that:
Corollary 2. There is a positive correlation between director competence on the one hand and measures of the power
of C’s and B’s pay-performance-sensitivities, short-horizon interactions of C and B, difficulty of appropriation of
private benefits by C, and a mean-preserving spread of outcomes of projects, on the other hand, respectively.
Thus, the model yields multiple hypotheses that should be tested jointly. These variables are measurable, both in
principle and in practice. Director competence can be gleaned (albeit imperfectly) from the director’s educational
background, her previous professional experience (perhaps in particular in the relevant sector), the level of positions
attained in other companies, etc.17 In addition to the level of previous experience, the diversity of experience is also
17Biographical data is available, for example, through the Corporate Library, BoardEx, and other sources. Various datasets now also offer direct
measures of board-specific skills.
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likely to matter.18 One might also consider abnormal announcement returns when a new director joins, assuming that
the market can accurately gauge a director’s competence. There are various measures of pay-performance-sensitivities.
Proxies for the duration of the interaction include the extent of interlocking relationships, the extent of pre-existing ties
Fracassi and Tate (2009) or CEO and director age. Another measure could be the number of anti-takeover provisions;
more such provisions tend to imply longer CEO and director tenure.19 Volatility of earnings and returns, either for the
same firm or for firms in the same industry, may be appropriate measures of the potential downside, yL, for a given
expected future development.20 Finally, for the difficulty of appropriation of private benefits by the CEO, one might
use a firm’s free cash flow or indices of other corporate governance qualities Boone et al. (2007). For example, even if
the board of directors fails to adequately reign in the CEO, the market for corporate takeovers may still put a limit on
what the CEO can achieve. This would indicate that where the CEO is strongly protected against takeovers (through
poison pills etc.), he can expect more private benefits (higher ψ) once he gets the board on this side.21
The model assumes that the CEO selects board quality. Of course, some firms have installed nominating commit-
tees, sometimes without CEO participation. To the extent that shareholders are able to influence the selection process
more strongly (for example because companies are adopting a majority voting rule, rather than a plurality vote, or are
proposing director slates that contain more candidate directors than seats to be filled), boards will be more competent.
In a regression that aims to explain director competence, we thus expect a negative coefficient on an interaction effect
between environment difficulty and CEO participation in the nomination process.22
A good reason for a firm not to hire the most competent director available in the market is that he may just be too
expensive. With perfect labor markets and identical firm technologies for using board competence, this consideration
has no effect on the desired competence level. The reason is that the marginal product of director competence would
be exactly offset by the higher wage. However, one could aim to include a measure of the market wage sensitivity
of directors with respect to their competence. Clearly, this is a challenging task for the empirical analysis, not least
because this wage sensitivity is endogenous to the co-option problem itself.
As indicated in the footnotes to this section, limited direct evidence is as of now available on how board competence
affects the choice of boards and on whether CEO’s choices of boards take the loyalty-competence tradeoff into account.
The studies cited provide some elements of the puzzle, and they are consistent with the model laid out in this paper.
18Becker et al. (2008) find that a measure of strategic capability of a board based on the diversity of their experience is associated with higher
firm value and higher announcement returns in acquisitions. See also Cohen et al. (2009) for evidence on the positive relationship between board
competence and economic outcomes.
19Of course, both interlocking relationships and anti-takeover provisions are endogenous, resulting in econometric challenges no different from
other governance studies.
20Markarian and Parbonetti (2008) provide evidence that firms choose directors who have more expertise in the business field when the environ-
ment is complex.
21Consistent with the model, DeFond et al. (2005) find that the market reacts favorably to the appointment of accounting financial experts when
corporate governance is strong, i.e., when not much x can be paid.
22There is some indirect evidence in favor of these predictions. Shareholders seem to prefer a majority vote over a plurality rule, where the latter
is de facto equivalent to appointment by the CEO Cai et al. (2009a). Gerety et al. (2001) find that stock markets react less favorably to the adoption
of director incentive plans when the CEO has greater influence over the director selection process. Because shareholders’ welfare is increasing in
director competence, the stock market effect is likely to capture, at least to a substantial extent, lower competence of directors. However, Harris
and Raviv (2008a), in a model of delegation and private information, show that shareholder participation is far from a one-sided story.
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Nonetheless, more systematic tests, guided by the hypotheses developed in this paper, would be desirable.23
3. Discussion and robustness analysis
3.1. Discussion and further predictions
Efficient loyalty. The results so far imply that there is a tradeoff between competence and inefficient board loyalty. If
such loyalty is infeasible, this is beneficial for the shareholders. But in reality, shareholders may, in fact, benefit in
other ways from a powerful relational contract between the CEO and the board. In particular, mutual loyalty may be
efficient if, for example, information sharing depends on a working loyalty agreement. This would be in the spirit of
Adams and Ferreira (2007). Also, entrenchment arising from a co-opted board could encourage managers to invest in
firm-specific human capital and in projects with long-term payoffs. Fortunately, however, this bright side of loyalty is
actually more easily sustained with competent directors. To see this, consider the case where directors find it costly to
reveal some useful information to the CEO, and the information transfer is not contractible. (If directors can costlessly
share information, there is no problem.) More competent directors have more valuable information, as in the main
model. But this means that more competent directors increase the ”pie” that is available for distribution in terms of
rewards for loyal information-sharing. Consequently, the CEO can promise more credibly that he will reward good
relations. This could be formally modeled, but the intuition is clear: It cannot be argued that less competent directors
are needed in order to sustain productive cooperative relations between CEOs and boards. Instead, where good CEO-
director relations are efficient, this will be easier with competent directors; only inefficient obedience is more easily
secured from incompetent directors. A self-interested CEO would take this into account when choosing his board.
In other words, the potential for co-option per se (which is facilitated by the CEO being heavily involved in director
choice) is not necessarily bad, but its value implications depend on what co-option is used for. Coles et al. (2008b) find
evidence consistent with this idea. They measure co-option by the ratio of the number of board members appointed
after the CEO took office to the total size of the board. While boards that score higher on this measure are less likely
to fire the CEO for poor performance (thus showing inefficient loyalty), they are also associated with higher research
and development expenditures, and co-option is more prevalent in firms benefiting from this. Similarly, the model
here implies that the empirical predictions of Corollary 2 obtain especially strongly in a sample of firms for whom
efficient loyalty considerations are not important. This is the case, for example, when the CEO does not have a large
information advantage (in which case a friendly board is of limited help, see Adams and Ferreira (2007)).
Optimistic CEOs. In this model, CEOs recognize that boards have a useful advisory function, but they know that
competent directors are hard to induce to loyalty. Of course, some CEOs are very convinced that what they are doing
23Finally, there is some anecdotal evidence of the loyalty-competence tradeoff ”the other way around,” namely that chairmen of boards, when
they ”move up” from the CEO’s chair, do not want too competent CEOs because they may break with their preferred strategy for the firm. An
already classic case in point is Volkswagen. Ferdinand Pie¨ch strongly wanted to induce his successor as CEO, Bernd Pischetsrieder, to keep to the
strategy designed by Pie¨ch. In fact, some argued at the time that Pie¨ch favored Pischetsrieder precisely because he was not the most competent
CEO available (Manager-Magazin, October 18, 1999, August 19, 2000, January 21, 2001, and February 28, 2001.) It turned out that Pischetsrieder
did not behave loyally enough. After a prolonged (and probably costly) struggle, Pie¨ch forced Pischetsrieder out.
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is in the best interest of the firm and that they, therefore, do not need a board who advises or occasionally vetoes them.
Thus, we would also expect overoptimistic CEOs (and overconfident CEOs, who underestimate the volatility of their
forecasts) to prefer less competent boards, because they do not value the board’s advice highly, relative to the benefits
they reap from board loyalty.
Term limits. When inefficient loyalty is the only concern, term limits for directors (and/or CEOs) have clear advantages
because they hinder the feasibility of a loyalty agreement between B and C. (Indeed, with a known finite time horizon,
a standard backwards induction argument implies that the spot interaction outcome is the only Nash equilibrium.)
Once we allow for the possibility of relations between the CEO and the board that enhance shareholder value, this
conclusion does not hold anymore. Thus, much as firms face a tradeoff when they decide whether to institute a job
rotation program, so do corporations when deciding how long the possible interaction between executives and boards
should be.
Voting on boards. Although the interactions within the board are not modeled here, we can speculate about how
different majority requirements for board decisions might affect the equilibrium. (See also Warther (1998) for a
discussion that is similar in spirit.) In particular, consider the unanimity rule and the majority rule. Under majority,
it is quite likely that the CEO can more easily sustain the loyalty of the board, perhaps even with high consensus.
To see this, consider the decision an individual board member faces who is contemplating deviating from the loyalty
agreement with the CEO. A deviation (if it becomes known) results in a loss of future loyalty rewards by the CEO.
But it is quite uncertain whether the board member can avoid the implementation of a value-destroying project (or
a project he simply does not find appealing). The reason is that the other board members may still vote in favor
of the project, leading to a majority for it. Indeed, especially on large boards, the board members have a collective
action problem similar to that of any group. A possible equilibrium is that all board members go along with the project
because that is still better than to deviate and be punished in the future. This, in turn, implies that the CEO can ”afford”
a more competent board, leading to better corporate decisions. By contrast, with a unanimity rule, the CEO has to
secure each individual director’s loyalty, and this will require lower board competence. Although one would have to
specify the game more precisely to obtain robust predictions regarding optimal majority rules, board competence, and
possibly board size, these speculative hypotheses seem interesting enough to merit further inquiry.
Easy situations. The formal analysis for easy situations (Ey > 0) is available on request. The economic intuition is
very simple, however. Assume that the incentives for the CEO are low-powered. In this case, he prefers to accept
all projects. He can obtain this outcome by choosing a board with zero competence and no loyalty reward – he
does not need to pay for loyalty, since an independent but incompetent board will accept all projects anyways. Since
accepting all projects is the best C can do with any scheme, and it can be achieved at zero cost with an independent
but incompetent board, it is obvious that this is best for C. The implication of this observation is nonetheless worth
spelling out: In easy situations, the possibility of a repeated loyalty contract introduces no additional conflict between
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shareholders and C, because even in spot interaction, optimal board competence is zero. The co-option problem is,
therefore, particularly relevant in difficult situations.
3.2. Robustness
This section discusses three ways in which we can deviate from the basic model.
Partial loyalty. First, consider the possibility that C may engage in a loyalty agreement with B only in some states. It
is useful to introduce some terminology for the following results. A comprehensive loyalty agreement describes the
case where B is loyal in all states and C rewards in all states. This is the type of agreement we have considered so far.
A partial loyalty agreement describes the case where C rewards loyalty only in either state L or in states U and L, and
B is loyal in the rewarded states. (B consents to the project in state H even without additional rewards.)
It turns out that partial loyalty only in state L is never optimal. The proof of Proposition 4 reveals that partial
loyalty and competence are complements in terms of feasibility here. That is, the CEO can get a fully competent
board member to engage in loyalty in only the low state. In fact, the minimum loyalty rewards are lowest for the most
competent boards, and the maximum loyalty rewards C can promise are highest for the most competent boards. Given
that C is not planning on inducing loyalty in the uncertain state, and given that B is not agreeing to a project when that
state does arise, it is cheapest for C to avoid this state by maximizing competence. But the expected costs of partial
loyalty still turn out to be too high relative to the gains from partial loyalty, when compared to the benefits and costs
of comprehensive loyalty.
Suppose now that C would like to pay B to be loyal in states L and U. Assuming competence is positive, the
minimum required loyalty rewards can be shown to be increasing in board competence, while the maximum rewards
C can offer are, under some conditions, decreasing in board competence. Thus, as in the main case, feasibility of this
type of partial loyalty is limited. One can show that C’s welfare is decreasing in board competence. (At first sight,
higher competence might be preferred because this increases the probability of the high and low states compared to
the unknown state and because in the high state no loyalty rewards have to be paid. However, it turns out that the
required rewards for loyalty are rising even faster, overturning the first effect.) The maximally attainable utility for the
CEO, therefore, occurs for minimal board competence. But for zero board competence, state U is certain to arise.
Thus, loyalty in states L and U is never desired.
We can summarize these results in the following way:
Proposition 4. If C prefers implementing any loyalty, then a comprehensive loyalty agreement is preferred. In this
case, C prefers an incompetent B. Otherwise, spot interaction with a fully competent B is preferred. C never im-
plements a partial loyalty agreement, even though loyalty in the low state is, if at all, feasible for more competent
Bs.
Proof. See the Appendix.
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Sequential moves. The simultaneous-move assumption made so far is appropriate when the CEO needs to engage in
rewarding actions before the board meeting, which are sunk at the time the meeting takes place, but the board cannot
observe whether the actions have been taken until it has taken a decision whether to support the CEO or not. There
may be instances where the CEO is tempted to renege on a promised loyalty reward, particularly if they are delayed
rewards. Building a reputation for rewarding loyalty certainly is one option, but this is outside the present model.
Even so, the basic predictions of the model remain intact.
We will say that only C is tempted, if only C’s non-reneging constraint needs to hold, whereas for B, only individual
rationality, is required, i.e., the loyalty rewards must be greater than the expected costs of loyalty. First, we find that
Proposition 5. If only C is tempted, a comprehensive loyalty agreement of a too competent B may be infeasible. A
partial loyalty agreement is more likely to be feasible for a competent B.
Proof. See the Appendix.
These results resemble the previous ones, and the intuition is similar, too: When the board is too competent, a CEO
engaged in a comprehensive loyalty agreement may be tempted to renege on the agreement, as the threat of the board
not to agree to ”unknown” projects weights relatively little. For partial loyalty, competent boards are more appropriate
as the unknown state thus arises relatively rarely, minimizing the CEO’s temptation to deviate.
When C is allowed to pick his preferred board, one can show that the outcome now depends on whether
(ψ + ayL) (1 − p) + sEy > 0. (13)
In particular, we have
Proposition 6. Suppose only C is tempted. If condition (13) holds, C implements a comprehensive loyalty agreement
with an indeterminate degree of board competence. If (13) does not hold, C prefers spot interaction with a maximally
competent B. C never implements a partial loyalty agreement.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The intuition for the result that the degree of competence is indeterminate in the first case is the following: Here, the
costs of loyalty are independent of the board’s competence, because the board has no commitment problem. Therefore,
C’s welfare is independent of board competence when he implements loyalty. The empirical predictions of Corollary 2
are thus slightly weakened, but overall they still go in the same direction. This can be seen from comparing conditions
(12) and (13). For example, as yL becomes more negative, both (12) and (13) are less likely to hold, leading to higher
optimal board competence, and less loyalty, in a cross-section of firms. The exception is the discount factor which
does not matter for the CEO’s choice in this case.
Contractible loyalty. Finally, it is instructive to consider the (unrealistic) case of contractible loyalty, i.e., the case
where C and B can in fact write a binding contract about loyalty. Rarely would a court enforce such a contract, as it
directly violates the director’s duty of loyalty to shareholders. If it were nonetheless possible, the cheapest way for C
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to obtain obedience is to pay B −syL in state L, and −sEy in state U. Plugging into the objective function for C reveals
that he maximizes utility by maximizing
ψ + (a + s) Ey − θspyH . (14)
Clearly, θ = 0 is optimal. Comparing the utility C obtains in this case, ψ + (a + s) Ey, with the utility he obtains from
spot interaction with a very competent board, p (ayH + ψ) reveals that loyalty is preferred if and only if
(1 − p) (ψ + ayL) + sEy > 0. (15)
This is, unsurprisingly, similar to the condition for the case of non-contractibility (Proposition 3). However,
comparing the two we find
Corollary 3. If non-contractible loyalty is preferred to spot interaction, so is contractible loyalty, but the opposite
does not hold.
Apart from adding realism to the model, the assumption of non-contractibility thus brings out the role of the
repeated interaction between CEOs and boards. Moreover, there are cases when non-contractible loyalty would be
desirable, but is infeasible (Proposition 2). By contrast, contractible loyalty is, by definition, always feasible. For the
CEO and the board, focusing on the non-contractible features may even be preferred: If loyalty is contractible and they
agree on it, shareholders or potentially interested investors could take them to court over it.
4. Optimal incentives and the empirical relevance of the model’s predictions
This section studies what shareholders – in particular, activists like hedge funds, private equity groups, and insti-
tutional investors – can do within the confines of the model to shape the board-CEO relationship such that it suits their
interests. In particular, it investigates how shareholders can set optimal incentives for the CEO and the board. Of
course, in reality the board proposes or enacts the CEO’s compensation scheme, so this issue is in principle subject
to the same co-option problem the main model has studied. (Indeed, with suitable definitions of ”projects,” and ”pri-
vate benefits,” the model can be applied to the setting of compensation schemes for a CEO.) Here, we explore the
implications for the co-option problem of shareholders taking the lead in compensation matters.24
The analysis first shows that if shareholders are free to choose the board’s and the CEO’s compensation, they
can contract away the co-option problem. In particular, if they give the CEO or the board sufficiently high-powered
incentives, the CEO prefers maximal board competence. Thus, the empirical predictions regarding board competence
would not hold. However, to the extent that incentive pay also needs to address other challenges (such as a moral
hazard problem) and to the extent that the solution of the moral hazard and the co-option problems do not happen to
coincide, the empirical predictions of this model will still obtain.
24This is not the only possible shareholder action. Apart from setting incentives, one might analyze takeovers and firing of the board and the
CEO, especially when a CEO and board are in the punishment phase of the repeated game. While such interventions by shareholders in the repeated
game are interesting (they change the off-equilibrium path), they are outside the scope of the paper. Yet another way for shareholders to approach
the problem would be to try to establish a competing loyalty contract with directors.
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To develop the results, let us return to the model setup as in section 2. For a given incentive package {a, s} the
shareholders’ welfare when C can implement loyalty with an incompetent director is EuL
S
= (1 − a − s) Ey < 0.
By contrast, for the same incentive package, if spot interaction were the outcome, their welfare would be EuS
S
=
θp (1 − a − s) yH ≥ 0. Thus, in difficult environments, shareholders would optimally try to avoid loyalty. In reality,
they may not succeed, for various reasons. For example, they may not be able to solve their collective action problem
in addressing the issue. The purpose of the analysis here is to determine what would happen to shareholder welfare
when shareholders can in fact do what is best for them. In the extreme, of course, B would become obsolete. To
motivate the existence of B, assume, for example, that the shareholders cannot gather the information on the project
quality. Note also that whichever friction we introduce, it makes it more likely that the shareholders cannot costlessly
set the optimal incentives described here – and that in turn implies that the new equilibrium may not obtain, retaining
instead the empirical predictions of the main model.
To make loyalty undesirable for C, shareholders need to obtain
(1 − p) (ψ + ayL) + s
Ey
δ
≤ 0. (16)
Because of the linearity in a and s, and because these parameters are perfect substitutes in the shareholders’ welfare
function, it is not obvious whom the shareholders should optimally incentivize.25 From (16), we find that:
Lemma 1. To induce C to favor a competent director and forego loyalty, shareholders will use CEO incentive pay
only and no incentives for directors if and only if
1 − δ <
p
1 − p
yH
−yL
. (17)
In this case, they set s = 0 and a =
−ψ
yL
. If instead this condition does not hold, they set a = 0 and s =
(1−p)ψδ
−Ey
.
The notion that optimal incentives require a to be just large enough to align C’s incentives with those of the
shareholders (and s = 0) is intuitively obvious – but the Lemma shows that it is not always true, and it specifies
the conditions under which this result does not hold. Interestingly, it might be better for shareholders to attack the
problem by giving B a bigger incentive to keep it from being co-opted by management. This situation arises when
interactions are not too long-lasting (e.g., when term limits are shorter or when takeover provisions are weaker) and
when the expected value of good projects is small compared to the expected loss of bad projects.26
Consider first a =
−ψ
yL
and s = 0. Note that in this case, even though C could achieve loyalty at zero cost (because
B is not hurt by bad projects), C does not benefit from it. In response to these incentives, C will choose θ = 1, which
leads to EuS
S
= pyH
(
1 +
ψ
yL
)
> 0. Since the shareholders realize positive welfare, they will prefer this outcome to the
loyalty outcome. Conversely, when condition (17) does not hold, shareholders only incentivize B, but this again leads
25Shareholders set incentives such that loyalty becomes undesirable. They may also make loyalty unfeasible, but one can show that this is going
to be more costly unless players are very impatient or the good state is very rare. As this analysis is not particularly revealing, it is omitted for space
reasons.
26The assumptions made so far do not necessarily guarantee that
(1−p)ψδ
−Ey
≤ 1 but this is assumed here.
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C to choose θ = 1 (this time because loyalty is becoming prohibitively expensive to obtain). And again, shareholders
will do at least as well as before.
This analysis can be summarized in the following
Proposition 7. If shareholders can costlessly and freely choose incentives for B and C, they optimally implement high-
powered CEO incentive pay or high-powered director incentive pay. This induces C to favor competent directors who
behave independently.
To the extent that shareholders can incentivize their CEO or the directors perfectly, they can avoid inefficient
board-CEO loyalty, but only at a cost. High executive pay, especially when the CEO is powerful, can thus partially be
explained as a solution to the excessive board loyalty problem.27 The co-option problem, therefore, remains a relevant
threat to shareholder welfare even when they can costlessly impose the optimal incentives on the CEO or the directors.
Two extensions qualify this benchmark result. First, consider costly director competence. That is, suppose that
more competent directors require a larger profit share. Alternatively, acquiring knowledge about the quality of a
porject may require both competence and director effort, with the two factors contributing multiplicatively (i.e., in
complementary ways) to the probability that B is informed. In either case, the solution s = 0 may not be attainable.
But this in turn means that C may, in fact, hire a too competent and too expensive B for the shareholders’ tastes.
Second, under the benchmark Proposition 7, the empirical predictions of Corollary 2 become irrelevant because
the board will always be highly competent. Clearly, this is counterfactual. The relevance of the empirical predictions
returns when one takes into account that in practice there are other factors, like more traditional versions of moral
hazard, that drive incentives for CEOs and boards. In the absence of the co-option problem, shareholders may set,
say, aˆ and sˆ as the optimal pay-performance sensitivities. These incentives will, in general, differ from the incentives
prescribed by Lemma 1. Unless shareholders are willing to depart from the optimal solution to this moral hazard
problem, the co-option equilibrium, as developed so far in the paper, may still arise. This is true in particular if aˆ and
sˆ are such that (16) does not hold. This will happen if only relatively low-powered incentives are needed or optimal
to address the moral hazard problem. This in turn holds if, for example, the CEO is very risk-averse or if effort and
output are linked through a very noisy process. An explicit model including both a standard moral hazard problem
and board co-option is beyond the scope of this paper, but an interesting avenue for future research. For the purposes
of empirical research on board competence, we can summarize these considerations as follows:
Corollary 4. Suppose there are reasons, such as a moral hazard problem, to deviate from the optimal incentive scheme
that avoids the co-option prolem. The empirical predictions regarding board competence of corollary 2 will continue
to obtain if optimal incentives in the absence of the co-option problem are relatively low-powered.
27This reflects the observation of Williamson (2008) that it is necessary and possible ”to understand the objective limitations of corporate boards
by examining the relevant microanalytics through a focused lens” (p. 268). See Albuquerque and Miao (2007) for an alternative model with a
similar result. Also note that to the extent that shareholders can use only compensation techniques with some bound on CEO liability in bad states
(e.g., when equity-based compensation goes hand in hand with an option program), their welfare loss compared to a case where there are no private
benefits for the CEO would be even greater because the CEO would have a more powerful incentive to push for an incompetent director.
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5. Concluding remarks
Academics and practitioners alike have emphasized the importance of an effective board. Much of the debate has
focused on the advantages and disadvantages of formally independent directors, with mixed results. Also, practi-
tioners emphasize the importance of board competence as such, but rarely recognize its economic relevance for the
relationship between directors and the CEO. This paper studies independence of directors as an optimal behavior that
is endogenously determined by board competence and other parameters. The basic message of the paper is that board
competence is neither equal to nor separate from board independence, but is one of the driving forces behind it.
To allow the sharpest focus, the paper begins by studying inefficient loyalty of boards to CEOs (or de facto obe-
dience). Because boards and CEOs often interact over long time horizons, the model uses a relational contracting
framework, thus adding to the literature on boards that has so far mostly considered static (if multi-stage) models.
The central result of the analysis is that in a wide range of plausible circumstances, more competent boards will be-
have less loyally to the CEO. Consequently, measures of de iure board independence are likely to be only partially
related to de facto independent board behavior. The paper also shows and provides conditions for the result that even
when a CEO could implement inefficient loyalty, he may after all be better off with more competent board members,
because loyalty is costly. One implication is that shareholders who succeed in installing a sufficiently competent board
will reap the rewards of a board that is endogenously less dependent on the CEO. Efficient loyalty (which may, for
example, improve information sharing between the CEO and the board) is, in addition, more easily sustained with
competent directors because they increase the surplus that supports the relational contract. Shareholder participation
in director elections per se is not going to improve governance; it does so when shareholders will, in fact, elect more
competent directors. The model helps organize some existing empirical facts, and it yields a set of new testable
hypotheses. While the model is robust to several changes in modeling assumptions, a number of simplifications had
to be made in order to keep the analysis tractable. As such, this paper is a step forward in our understanding of
corporate governance, but it leaves substantial room for future research. In particular, employing the framework of a
self-enforcing contract between the board and the CEO seems to allow interesting extensions to address issues such
as intra-board relationships, interventions by shareholders, and a combination of the co-option problem with a moral
hazard problem.
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6. Appendix: Proofs
Propositions 1 to 3 are derived in the text.
Corollary 1: (i) When C has a greater stake in the firm’s performance, he will less likely implement loyalty.
(ii) When B has a greater stake in the firm’s performance, C will less likely implement loyalty.
(iii) The more private benefits C obtains from implementing projects, the more likely he is to implement loyalty.
(iv) For a given expected NPV Ey < 0, the worse the bad project outcome gets, the less likely C is to implement
loyalty.
(v) The shorter the expected duration of the interaction between C and B is, the less likely C is to implement
loyalty.
Proof. Properties (i) to (iv) follow immediately from inspection of (11). For property (v), this proof will show that
if loyalty is preferred to spot interaction at δ = 1, then, above a certain cutoff level δˆ, longer durations of interactions
make loyalty more desirable, i.e., ∂Ω
∂δ
< 0. If spot interaction is preferred to loyalty at δ = 1, then spot interaction is
always preferred.
Define r = 1−δ
δ
, L (r) = ψ + aEy + (1 + r) sEy and K = p (ayH + ψ) . Then,
Ω (r) =
K − L (r)
r
.
Taking the derivative with respect to r, we have
∂Ω
∂r
= −
1
r
(Ω (r) + sEy) .
Note that ∂Ω
∂r
is positive if and only if Ω (r) + sEy < 0. This in turn is true for all r if K − L (0) < 0, because then
Ω (r) → −∞ as r → 0 (and δ → 1), and Ω (r) → −sEy from below as r → ∞ (and δ → 0). Therefore, there will be
a critical value of r, say, rˆ, such that C prefers an independent board if and only if r ≥ rˆ. This implies that there is a
critical value of δ, say, δˆ, such that C prefers a loyal board if and only if δ ≥ δˆ.
If, by contrast, K−L (0) > 0, this means that loyalty is not even preferred to spot interaction when players are extremely
patient. Then, Ω (r) is strictly decreasing in r for all r : Ω (r)→ ∞ as r → 0 and Ω (r)→ −sEy from above as r → ∞.
In this case, C prefers an independent board for all values of r.
Overall, we obtain the empirical prediction that increasing δ leads C to either continue preferring spot interaction
(when K − L (0) > 0) or, at some point, to start preferring loyalty. This means that the shorter the expected duration
of the interaction between C and B is, the less likely C is to implement loyalty.
Proposition 4: If C prefers implementing any loyalty, then a comprehensive loyalty agreement is preferred.
In this case, C prefers an incompetent B. Otherwise, spot interaction with a fully competent B is preferred. C
never implements a partial loyalty agreement, even though loyalty is, if at all, feasible for more competent Bs.
Proof. First note that for θ = 0, the non-reneging constraint remains unchanged, as in this case loyalty is, by
definition, only implemented in the unknown state, as this is the only state that arises. The only question, therefore, is
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whether C could possibly do better with a board with positive competence and paying for loyalty only in state L or in
the L and U states. B always agrees to the project in the H state out of his own interest.
(i) Consider first the case where C wishes to induce loyalty in the L and U states. In this case, the two non-reneging
constraints are as follows. For C, we have:
ayL + ψ − x +
δ
1 − δ

θp (ayH + ψ) + θ (1 − p) (ayL + ψ − x)+
(1 − θ) (aEy + ψ − x)
 (18)
≥ ayL + ψ +
δ
1 − δ
[
θp (ayH + ψ) + θ (1 − p) (0) + (1 − θ) (0)
]
, (19)
which becomes
x ≤
δ
[
ψ − θp (ayH + ψ) + aEy
]
1 − δθp
. (20)
For B, we have:
syL + x +
δ
1 − δ
[
θpsyH + θ (1 − p) (syL + x) + (1 − θ) (sEy + x)
]
(21)
≥ x +
δ
1 − δ
[
θpsyH
]
,
which becomes
x ≥
−
syL
δ
+ ps
[
θyH − ∆
]
1 − θp
. (22)
The expected payoff for C is
EUPLC = θp (ayH + ψ) + θ (1 − p) (ayL + ψ − x) + (1 − θ) (aEy + ψ − x) = aEy + ψ − x + θpx. (23)
Taking the derivative with respect to θ, we have
∂EUPL
C
∂θ
= px (θ) − x′ (θ) (1 − θp) = −psyH < 0.
Thus, C’s welfare is decreasing in board competence. Thus, C would like to choose θ = 0. But then the state is always
U, contradicting the starting assumption. Another way to see this is to imagine that C sets a minimally positive θ.
Plugging in θ ≈ 0 into (22), this leads to loyalty rewards in the amount of
x = −s
(
yL
δ
+ p∆
)
. (24)
Thus, the expected payoff for C in partial loyalty becomes
EUPLC = aEy + ψ + s
(
yL
δ
+ p∆
)
. (25)
This is to be compared with the payoff when C implements comprehensive loyalty with zero competence,
EUCLC = aEy + ψ +
sEy
δ
. (26)
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Obviously, (26) is always greater than (25), concluding the proof of the first part.
(ii) The proof that C also does not want to implement a loyalty agreement where B is loyal only in the bad state
proceeds along similiar lines. C’s non-reneging constraint is
ayL + ψ − x +
δ
1 − δ

θp (ayH + ψ) + θ (1 − p) (ayL + ψ − x)+
(1 − θ) 0
 (27)
≥ ayL + ψ +
δ
1 − δ
[
θp (ayH + ψ) + θ (1 − p) (0) + (1 − θ) (0)
]
, (28)
implying
x ≤
δθ (1 − p)
1 − δ (1 − θ (1 − p))
(ayL + ψ) . (29)
B’s non-reneging constraint is
syL + x +
δ
1 − δ
[
θpsyH + θ (1 − p) (syL + x) + (1 − θ) 0
]
(30)
≥ x +
δ
1 − δ
[
θpsyH
]
,
implying
x ≥ −syL
1 − δ + δθ (1 − p)
δθ (1 − p)
. (31)
Note that the right-hand side of (31) is decreasing in θ. Thus, for C a highly competent board is cheapest to induce
to loyalty. This is different than in the main case studied in the paper, but it is intuitive: Given that C is not planning
on inducing loyalty in the uncertain state, and given that B is not agreeing to a project when that state does arise, it is
cheapest for C to avoid this state. There are two possibilities now: Either loyalty is not feasible even for θ = 1. That
would conclude the proof. Or loyalty is feasible for θ = 1. Then we need to check whether partial loyalty with θ = 1
is preferred to comprehensive loyalty. The costs of obtaining partial loyalty from a fully competent board are, by (31),
x = −
syL(1−δp)
δ(1−p)
. Therefore, C’s expected payoff from partial loyalty is
EUPLC = aEy + ψ + (1 − p)
syL (1 − δp)
δ (1 − p)
. (32)
We know that C’s expected payoff from comprehensive loyalty is
EUCLC = aEy + ψ + (1 − p)
sEy
δ
. (33)
Simple algebra confirms that (33)>(32) always.
Proposition 5: If only C is tempted, a comprehensive loyalty agreement of a too competent B may be infea-
sible. A partial loyalty agreement is more likely to be feasible for a competent B.
Proposition 6: Suppose only C is tempted. If condition (13) holds, C implements a comprehensive loyalty
agreement with an indeterminate degree of board competence. If (13) does not hold, C prefers spot interaction
with a maximally competent B. The CEO never implements a partial loyalty agreement.
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Proof. (of both Proposition 5 and 6). If only C is tempted, this means that only C’s NR constraint is relevant. The
NR for a comprehensive loyalty agreement takes exactly the same form as before:
x ≤ δ (ψ + aEy) − δθp (ψ + ayH) . (34)
For B, C just has to ensure that
x ≥ −sEy, (35)
leading to
θ ≤
δ (ψ + aEy) + sEy
p (δψ + δayH)
. (36)
That is, there is an upper bound on competence compatible with comprehensive loyalty, as stated in Proposition 5.
Conditional on comprehensive loyalty being feasible, the payoff to C is
EU
comp
C
= θp (ayH + ψ + sEy) + θ (1 − p) (ayL + ψ + sEy) + (1 − p) (aEy + ψ + sEy) (37)
= (a + s) Ey + ψ,
which is independent of θ. The reason for this independence is that the costs C incurs for inducing B to loyalty are
independent of B’s type, as B has no commitment problem.
By contrast, consider a partial loyalty agreement where C only pays for (and only receives) loyalty in state L. C’s NR
constraint in this case is
x ≤
δθ (1 − p) (ayL + ψ)
1 − δ (1 − θ (1 − p))
, (38)
which can be easily shown to be increasing in θ, implying that partial loyalty and competence are complements for C,
as stated in Proposition 5. Whether loyalty is, in fact, feasible depends, however, on whether
−syL ≤ x (θ) . (39)
Plugging in θ = 1, we can see that if
(ψ + ayL) (1 − p) + sEy > 0, (40)
then partial loyalty is feasible. C’s utility from optimal partial loyalty (with θ = 1) is
EU
partial
C
= aEy + ψ + s (1 − p) yL. (41)
But (37)>(41) always, implying that full loyalty (which as shown above happens with an indeterminate degree of
competence) is always preferred to partial loyalty.
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